BECOME A TERROR-IST TO KILL A TERRORIST ! PART-2
In the pioneering case of pseudo-operations in Kenya (1954), unconventional tactics were adopted to locate terrorists due to the fact that the intelligence units assigned to gather terrorism-related information could only provide strategic intelligence. Real time contact information needed by the military units to pinpoint the location of terrorist cadres was hard to obtain. The gap between strategic intelligence and contact information was effectively bridged by using pseudo-gangs. They would infiltrate an area that strategic intelligence had identified as live, operating there until they touched base with real terrorists. The key to the whole endeavour, however, was having a fairly detailed strategic intelligence picture in the first place. Thus the term " cats " originated.
Within the spectrum of counter-terrorist concepts, the ‘cat’ system falls squarely in the range of activities covered by the term ‘pseudo-terrorist operations’. Pseudo-terrorist operations essentially involve dispatching security force (SF) personnel masquerading as terrorists into areas of high terrorist activity, to make contact with real terrorist cadres. The SF personnel need to be schooled in terrorist terminology and armed with terrorist weaponry in order to masquerade convincingly as terrorists and so learn the latter’s whereabouts from their supporters in the local population. Once the real terrorists are situated accurately in terms of time and space, they can be surgically neutralized with minimal disruption to the local populace; this would not be possible if large, indiscriminate sweeps were used to locate them. Such pseudo-terrorist gangs would ideally include former terrorists who, upon capture, have been turned against their colleagues by a combined offer of reward and escape from punishment, should they co-operate. These ‘turned terrorists’ are different from those who are turned while still within a terrorist group, and who thus become clandestinely recruited informers-in-place.
The pseudo-gang’s turned terrorists mainly help the masquerading SF personnel bluff their way into making contact with the real terrorists. They function not as informers, since they no longer occupy a place in their original gang’s ranks from which they can secretly feed information, but as established members of the pseudo-gangs. Priority was given to individuals with a strong knowledge of the workings of the local underworld. These individuals were instructed to activate sources in the common link – the mafia, and collect information, which would allow the Police to apprehend the main leaders. By 1987, the experiment had been replicated across Punjab with considerable success. The authorities thus acquired a means to challenge the terrorists’ monopoly over the underworld as an operational logistics and recruitment arm. In late 1986, the term ‘cat’ made its appearance in reference to Police undercover operations intended to identify and neutralize hardcore terrorists.
Conceptually, the decision to infiltrate terrorist gangs through criminal connections already known to the Police was sound and methodical
In a bid to correct deviant behaviour, the Police introduced a screening programme for potential ‘cats’. Remuneration scales were also increased so as to establish a better control over their activities and ‘internalize’ pseudo-operations. It became increasingly clear that these operations were too essential
Money power was the key to turning terrorists, especially as their motives grew more mercenary over the years. The ‘cat’ system was only as effective as its capability to purchase loyalty and to punish lethargy. The strengths and weaknesses of the system lay in the freedom of initiative it accorded to Police operational officers on the ground, who would actually be handling the ‘cats’. Generally, those ‘cats’, who were heavily compromised by involvement in murders and threatened into co-operating rather than being simply bought off, seem to have been the most reliable. This might have been because the handling officer could always brandish the stick of punishment for past activity if the ‘cat’ faltered, and offered carrots in the form of bonuses only sparingly. The more desperate the ‘cat’ to buy his peace with the Police, the more he could be pressured to run risks while gathering information.
It is the context, the success of the ‘cat’ system was due to the strength of the pseudo-terrorist concept. The comprehensive use of ‘cats’ played an important, if not decisive, role in controlling and ultimately defeating the terrorist movement in Punjab. Punjab goes to show that more, not less pseudo-terrorist operations are necessary to rapidly build on transient tactical advantages, so that success may flow from success.
I fail to understand, why the above methodology is not being adopted by the central govt. to defeat the menace of terrorism, throughout the country.
Does anyone has any answers ?
Within the spectrum of counter-terrorist concepts, the ‘cat’ system falls squarely in the range of activities covered by the term ‘pseudo-terrorist operations’. Pseudo-terrorist operations essentially involve dispatching security force (SF) personnel masquerading as terrorists into areas of high terrorist activity, to make contact with real terrorist cadres. The SF personnel need to be schooled in terrorist terminology and armed with terrorist weaponry in order to masquerade convincingly as terrorists and so learn the latter’s whereabouts from their supporters in the local population. Once the real terrorists are situated accurately in terms of time and space, they can be surgically neutralized with minimal disruption to the local populace; this would not be possible if large, indiscriminate sweeps were used to locate them. Such pseudo-terrorist gangs would ideally include former terrorists who, upon capture, have been turned against their colleagues by a combined offer of reward and escape from punishment, should they co-operate. These ‘turned terrorists’ are different from those who are turned while still within a terrorist group, and who thus become clandestinely recruited informers-in-place.
The pseudo-gang’s turned terrorists mainly help the masquerading SF personnel bluff their way into making contact with the real terrorists. They function not as informers, since they no longer occupy a place in their original gang’s ranks from which they can secretly feed information, but as established members of the pseudo-gangs. Priority was given to individuals with a strong knowledge of the workings of the local underworld. These individuals were instructed to activate sources in the common link – the mafia, and collect information, which would allow the Police to apprehend the main leaders. By 1987, the experiment had been replicated across Punjab with considerable success. The authorities thus acquired a means to challenge the terrorists’ monopoly over the underworld as an operational logistics and recruitment arm. In late 1986, the term ‘cat’ made its appearance in reference to Police undercover operations intended to identify and neutralize hardcore terrorists.
Conceptually, the decision to infiltrate terrorist gangs through criminal connections already known to the Police was sound and methodical
In a bid to correct deviant behaviour, the Police introduced a screening programme for potential ‘cats’. Remuneration scales were also increased so as to establish a better control over their activities and ‘internalize’ pseudo-operations. It became increasingly clear that these operations were too essential
Money power was the key to turning terrorists, especially as their motives grew more mercenary over the years. The ‘cat’ system was only as effective as its capability to purchase loyalty and to punish lethargy. The strengths and weaknesses of the system lay in the freedom of initiative it accorded to Police operational officers on the ground, who would actually be handling the ‘cats’. Generally, those ‘cats’, who were heavily compromised by involvement in murders and threatened into co-operating rather than being simply bought off, seem to have been the most reliable. This might have been because the handling officer could always brandish the stick of punishment for past activity if the ‘cat’ faltered, and offered carrots in the form of bonuses only sparingly. The more desperate the ‘cat’ to buy his peace with the Police, the more he could be pressured to run risks while gathering information.
It is the context, the success of the ‘cat’ system was due to the strength of the pseudo-terrorist concept. The comprehensive use of ‘cats’ played an important, if not decisive, role in controlling and ultimately defeating the terrorist movement in Punjab. Punjab goes to show that more, not less pseudo-terrorist operations are necessary to rapidly build on transient tactical advantages, so that success may flow from success.
I fail to understand, why the above methodology is not being adopted by the central govt. to defeat the menace of terrorism, throughout the country.
Does anyone has any answers ?
posted by vaneet kundra at
Sunday, November 02, 2008
6 Comments:
everything can be controlled, including terrorism, provided you have the will do do so...
Dear Brigadier Nalwa,
You correctly put it last time, that you rearely write your comments but whenever you do, they are positive in nature. Being a man in a uniform, you can well understand that terrorism can be contained, provided the govt. has the will to do so. Why do you think, the govt, is not acting tough, when many tools are available with it ? Sometimes, i wonder, that whether these politicians are human beings or dead robots, doing nothing ? Politicians are known to have no emotions as they have reached the position, after trapling the graves of many people. It is irrelevant for them if 50 or 500 people die in a bomb blast !
I agree that politicians forget their audience after they get the position.
Bravo for writing this post! If 100 politicians will read it, then 1 out of them will surely try to control terrorism.
-Saurabh-
Dear Bollywood Lover,
Thanks for your comments. If police is given a free hand, without any political interference, i am sure, they can come out with some concrete catches of the " Brain " behind this terror. But there is a big if... Terrorists planting bombs are mere tools, behind the actual " Controller " of this terror attacks.
What do you have to say about hindu terrorists, arrested recently ?
Dear Deepak,
Thanks. Saw your comments after a long time. Regarding Hindu terrorists, first of all hindus are so meek and submissive, that they cant become terrorists. Centuries of slavery under different rulers have made them so dead and fearful, that leaving aside creating bomb blasts, they cant even think of a bomb. I think, sadhivi and a few people are just being framed. I think, it is an election gimmick by congress.
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